Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 22 (1/2)

Reply Obj. 3: In speaking ”of ignorance of choice,” we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be chosen.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 2]

Whether Choice Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals are able to choose. For choice ”is the desire of certain things on account of an end,” as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 2, 3. But irrational animals desire something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and from desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.

Obj. 2: Further, the very word _electio_ (choice) seems to signify the taking of something in preference to others. But irrational animals take something in preference to others: thus we can easily see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one gra.s.s and refuse another.

Therefore choice is in irrational animals.

Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vi, 12, ”it is from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means.” But prudence is found in irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of _Metaph._ i, 1 that ”those animals which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are prudent by instinct.” We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees, spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has pa.s.sed by the first or the second road: and if he find that the stag has not pa.s.sed there, being thus a.s.sured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the stag must have pa.s.sed by this way, since he did not pa.s.s by the others, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. x.x.xiii.]

says that ”children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice.” Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.

_I answer that,_ Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference between the sensitive appet.i.te and the will is that, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2, ad 3), the sensitive appet.i.te is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appet.i.te which is all that irrational animals have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing from another. And this cannot be except when the appet.i.te can be moved to several things.

Reply Obj. 2: An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another, because its appet.i.te is naturally determinate to that thing.

Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, is offered something to which its appet.i.te is naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just as fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its making any choice.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated in _Phys._ iii, 3 ”movement is the act of the movable, caused by a mover.” Wherefore the power of the mover appears in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is evident, although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes straight towards the target, as though it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by the art of man. Now as artificial things are in comparison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be seen in things moved by nature, just as in things moved by reason, as is stated in _Phys._ ii. And thus it is that in the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature, invariably act in the same way.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 3]

Whether Choice Is Only of the Means, or Sometimes Also of the End?

Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that ”virtue makes us choose aright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to direct aright those things which are to be done for its sake.” But that for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore choice is of the end.

Obj. 2: Further, choice implies preference of one thing to another.

But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that ”volition is of the end, but choice of the means.”

_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 1, ad 2), choice results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end, as such, is not a matter of choice.

But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of one demonstration or of one science, from being the conclusion of another demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science; so too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to something as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus in the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:10): ”For when I am weak, then am I powerful.” But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.

Reply Obj. 1: The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 5), there is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 4]

Whether Choice Is of Those Things Only That Are Done by Us?