Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 24 (1/2)

_I answer that,_ Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word (_consilium_) denotes this, for it means a sitting together (_considium_), from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circ.u.mstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.

Reply Obj. 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.

Reply Obj. 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.

Reply Obj. 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of affection--thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for the princ.i.p.al agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about what he would do through his servant.

________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 4]

Whether Counsel Is About All Things That We Do?

Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to do. For choice is the ”desire of what is counselled” as stated above (A. 1). But choice is about all things that we do.

Therefore counsel is too.

Obj. 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of pa.s.sion, we act in virtue of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we do.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that ”if it appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this.”

But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place in all things that we do.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. x.x.xiv.]

says that ”counsel has no place in things that are done according to science or art.”

_I answer that,_ Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above (A. 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, ”is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt” [*Cicero, _Topic._ ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].

Reply Obj. 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.

Reply Obj. 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel in all that is done by reason.

Reply Obj. 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is no need of counsel.

________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 5]

Whether the Process of Counsel Is One of a.n.a.lysis?

Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of a.n.a.lysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of our actions is not one of a.n.a.lysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz.

from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always proceed by way of a.n.a.lysis.

Obj. 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is not an a.n.a.lytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one of a.n.a.lysis.

Obj. 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to us, according to _Ethic._ iii, 3. But the question as to whether a certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that ”he who takes counsel seems to inquire and a.n.a.lyze.”

_I answer that,_ In every inquiry one must begin from some principle.

And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process is not a.n.a.lytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the process is one of a.n.a.lysis, as when our judgment deals with effects, which by a.n.a.lysis we trace to their simple causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution.