Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 35 (2/2)
(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?
(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?
(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 1]
Whether Goodness or Malice Is First in the Action of the Will, or in the External Action?
Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives goodness from its object, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 1, 2). But the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act of the will.
Obj. 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the external action, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 6). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter.
Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that ”it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright.” Therefore moral good and evil are first in the will.
_I answer that,_ External actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circ.u.mstances connected with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will's proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it pa.s.ses to the external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due circ.u.mstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.
Reply Obj. 1: The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.
Reply Obj. 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows in the order of execution.
Reply Obj. 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 2]
Whether the Whole Goodness and Malice of the External Action Depends on the Goodness of the Will?
Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written (Matt. 7:18): ”A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.” But, according to the gloss, the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the external action evil, or vice versa.
Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the will.
Obj. 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12).
Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that ”there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), we may consider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circ.u.mstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or circ.u.mstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.
Now it must be observed, as was noted above (Q. 19, A. 6, ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.
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