Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 38 (1/2)

Reply Obj. 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 4]

Whether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious Before G.o.d, According As It Is Good or Evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of G.o.d. Because, as stated above (A. 3), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does no good or harm to G.o.d; for it is written (Job 35:6, 7): ”If thou sin, what shalt thou hurt Him? ... And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him?” Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power which is the princ.i.p.al cause of his action; hence it is written (Isa. 10:15): ”Shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn?” where man while acting is evidently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in G.o.d's sight, by good or evil deeds.

Obj. 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained to G.o.d. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in G.o.d's sight.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 12:14): ”All things that are done, G.o.d will bring into judgment ... whether it be good or evil.” Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires merit or demerit in G.o.d's sight.

_I answer that,_ A human action, as stated above (A. 3), acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by reason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way, our actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of G.o.d. On the part of G.o.d Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end; and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 10). Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable to G.o.d, does not give G.o.d the honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole community of the universe, because in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the common good; wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community.

Now G.o.d is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the First Part (Q. 103, A. 5): and especially of rational creatures.

Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: else it would follow that human actions are no business of G.o.d's.

Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d in Himself neither gains nor loses anything by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from G.o.d, or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order inst.i.tuted by G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by G.o.d, that, at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above (Q. 9, A. 6, ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or demerit in G.o.d's sight.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to G.o.d: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of G.o.d, as far as the action itself is concerned.

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TREATISE ON THE Pa.s.sIONS (QQ. 22-48) ________________________

QUESTION 22

OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S Pa.s.sIONS (In Three Articles)

We must now consider the pa.s.sions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relations.h.i.+p: (4) Their malice and goodness.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is any pa.s.sion in the soul?

(2) Whether pa.s.sion is in the appet.i.tive rather than in the apprehensive part?

(3) Whether pa.s.sion is in the sensitive appet.i.te rather than in the intellectual appet.i.te, which is called the will?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 1]

Whether Any Pa.s.sion Is in the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no pa.s.sion in the soul.

Because pa.s.sivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of matter and form, as stated in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore there is no pa.s.sion in the soul.

Obj. 2: Further, pa.s.sion is movement, as is stated in _Phys._ iii, 3.

But the soul is not moved, as is proved in _De Anima_ i, 3. Therefore pa.s.sion is not in the soul.