Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 41 (2/2)

(1) The relation of the irascible pa.s.sions to the concupiscible pa.s.sions;

(2) The relation of the concupiscible pa.s.sions to one another;

(3) The relation of the irascible pa.s.sions to one another;

(4) The four princ.i.p.al pa.s.sions.

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]

Whether the Irascible Pa.s.sions Precede the Concupiscible Pa.s.sions, or Vice Versa?

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible pa.s.sions precede the concupiscible pa.s.sions. For the order of the pa.s.sions is that of their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible pa.s.sions seem to precede the concupiscible pa.s.sions.

Obj. 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purpose of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1; I, Q. 81, A. 2). Now ”that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover”

(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible pa.s.sions precede the concupiscible pa.s.sions.

Obj. 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible pa.s.sions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible pa.s.sions: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that ”retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain.” Therefore the concupiscible pa.s.sions follow the irascible pa.s.sions.

_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible pa.s.sions regard the absolute good, while the irascible pa.s.sions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible pa.s.sions precede the irascible.

_I answer that,_ In the concupiscible pa.s.sions there is more diversity than in the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we find something relating to movement--e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible pa.s.sions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.

Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we compare the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible pa.s.sions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of execution, the irascible pa.s.sions take precedence of such like pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): ”Rejoicing in hope.” But the concupiscible pa.s.sion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible pa.s.sions: because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every pa.s.sion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible pa.s.sion denoting rest, viz.

either in joy or in sadness.

But if we compare the irascible pa.s.sions to those concupiscible pa.s.sions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take precedence: because the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.

Accordingly the pa.s.sions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible pa.s.sions that denote movement towards good or evil, and those concupiscible pa.s.sions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible pa.s.sions both arise from and terminate in the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous.

But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.

Reply Obj. 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of pa.s.sions as directly related to one another. Moreover, the irascible pa.s.sion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.

Wherefore it only follows that the irascible pa.s.sions precede those concupiscible pa.s.sions that connote rest. The third objection leads to the same conclusion.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 2]

Whether Love Is the First of the Concupiscible Pa.s.sions?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible pa.s.sions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same pa.s.sion as desire. But ”things are named from their chief characteristic” (De Anima ii, 4).

Therefore desire takes precedence of love.

Obj. 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a ”uniting and binding force,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.

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