Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 47 (1/2)
FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]
Whether Evil Is the Cause and Object of Hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue.
Obj. 2: Further, hatred of evil is praiseworthy; hence (2 Macc. 3:1) some are praised for that ”the laws were very well kept, because of the G.o.dliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil.” If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false.
Obj. 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.
_On the contrary,_ Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 1). Therefore the object of hatred is evil.
_I answer that,_ Since the natural appet.i.te is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural appet.i.te), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appet.i.te, applies also to the animal appet.i.te, which does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 1). Now, with regard to the natural appet.i.te, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appet.i.te, or in the intellectual appet.i.te, love is a certain harmony of the appet.i.te with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appet.i.te from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.
Reply Obj. 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good.
Reply Obj. 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appet.i.te, owing to one and the same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water: and in respect of the animal appet.i.te, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 2]
Whether Love Is a Cause of Hatred?
Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For ”the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous”
(Praedic. x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
Obj. 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
Obj. 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good.
Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion of the soul, is caused by love.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love.
Reply Obj. 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred.
Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary.
Reply Obj. 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appet.i.tive movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution.
Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appet.i.tive movement.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 3]
Whether Hatred Is Stronger Than Love?
Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): ”There is no one who does not flee from pain, more than he desires pleasure.” But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love.
Therefore hatred is stronger than love.
Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into hatred.