Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 48 (2/2)

Reply Obj. 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension or appet.i.te.

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QUESTION 30

OF CONCUPISCENCE (In Four Articles)

We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appet.i.te only?

(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific pa.s.sion?

(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?

(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]

Whether Concupiscence Is in the Sensitive Appet.i.te Only?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appet.i.te. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according to Wis. 6:21: ”The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom.” But the sensitive appet.i.te can have no tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appet.i.te.

Obj. 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of G.o.d is not in the sensitive appet.i.te: in fact the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): ”There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good.”

But desire for G.o.d's commandments is an act of concupiscence, according to Ps. 118:20: ”My soul hath coveted (_concupivit_) to long for thy justifications.” Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appet.i.te.

Obj. 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, and not only in the sensitive appet.i.te.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that ”the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, pa.s.sive and appet.i.tive.” Therefore concupiscence is in the sensitive appet.i.te.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), ”concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant.” Now pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on (Q. 31, AA. 3, 4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ: wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word ”concupiscentia.” Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appet.i.te, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it.

Reply Obj. 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appet.i.te, so that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appet.i.te, the result being that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. 83:3: ”My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living G.o.d.”

Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appet.i.te. For it does not imply fellows.h.i.+p in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired.

Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appet.i.te, which does not arise from apprehension.

But the craving for good, by the animal appet.i.te, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appet.i.tive power alone. And to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 2]

Whether Concupiscence Is a Specific Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific pa.s.sion of the concupiscible power. For pa.s.sions are distinguished by their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific pa.s.sion of the concupiscible faculty.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that ”covetousness is the love of transitory things”: so that it is not distinct from love. But all specific pa.s.sions are distinct from one another.

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