Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 50 (1/2)
Whether Delight Is a Pa.s.sion?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a pa.s.sion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from pa.s.sion, and says that ”operation is a movement in accord with nature, while pa.s.sion is a movement contrary to nature.” But delight is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5).
Therefore delight is not a pa.s.sion.
Obj. 2: Further, ”To be pa.s.sive is to be moved,” as stated in _Phys._ iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a pa.s.sion.
Obj. 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it ”perfects operation,” as stated in _Ethic._ x, 4, 5. But to be perfected does not consist in being pa.s.sive or in being altered, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 3 and _De Anima_ ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a pa.s.sion.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other pa.s.sions of the soul.
_I answer that,_ The movements of the sensitive appet.i.te, are properly called pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te: and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) ”delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establis.h.i.+ng thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing.”
In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appet.i.te; which movement is called delight.
Accordingly by saying that delight is ”a movement of the soul,” we designate its genus. By saying that it is ”an establis.h.i.+ng in keeping with the thing's nature,” i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we a.s.sign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By saying that this establis.h.i.+ng is ”all at once,” we mean that this establis.h.i.+ng is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a ”becoming” as Plato [*Phileb. 32, 33] maintained, but a ”complete fact,” as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establis.h.i.+ng is ”sensible,” we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appet.i.te arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a pa.s.sion of the soul.
Reply Obj. 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in _De Anima_ ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.
Reply Obj. 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appet.i.te; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which he tends to the end; yet the movement of the appet.i.tive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appet.i.te, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appet.i.te, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appet.i.te by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement.
Reply Obj. 3: Although the name of pa.s.sion is more appropriate to those pa.s.sions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some pa.s.sions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 4): and in this sense delight is called a pa.s.sion.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]
Whether Delight Is in Time?
Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For ”delight is a kind of movement,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
Obj. 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore pleasure is in time.
Obj. 3: Further, the pa.s.sions of the soul are of one same genus. But some pa.s.sions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that ”no one takes pleasure according to time.”
_I answer that,_ A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7, movement is twofold.
One is ”the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such”: this movement is successive and is in time.
Another movement is ”the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act,” e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.
Reply Obj. 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.
Reply Obj. 3: Other pa.s.sions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 3]