Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 52 (2/2)
Obj. 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
Obj. 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the opposite of custom. But things ”which we are accustomed to, are pleasant,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): ”What means this, O Lord my G.o.d, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and reconciled?” From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to cause pleasure.
_I answer that,_ Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e.
the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because man desires to know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pa.s.s and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): ”Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please collectively more than they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively.”
If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its delight at once--to such a one change will afford no delight. And the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being continual.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural apt.i.tude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by removing the obstacles to our natural apt.i.tude.
Reply Obj. 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become pleasant.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 3]
Whether Hope and Memory Cause Pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future.
Therefore memory and hope do not cause pleasure.
Obj. 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: ”Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul.” Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.
Obj. 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be a.s.signed as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 12:12): ”Rejoicing in hope”; and (Ps. 76:4): ”I remembered G.o.d, and was delighted.”
_I answer that,_ Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present to us in two ways. First, in knowledge--i.e. according as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality--i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of apprehension.
Reply Obj. 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fas.h.i.+on, present, i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.
Reply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.
Reply Obj. 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already pa.s.sed away.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 4]
Whether sadness causes pleasure?
Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.
Therefore it does not cause it.
Obj. 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures, when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.
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