Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 55 (2/2)
We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appet.i.tive power in some loved good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we a.s.sign a twofold reason for this a.s.sertion. The first is in respect of the good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5): just as in the order of nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance, when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appet.i.te rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appet.i.te rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of G.o.d.
The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions evil.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 33, A. 3), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 3), either by contrariety of the appet.i.te that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times.
We must add, however, that although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as stated in the First Part (Q. 98, A. 2) the case was different in the state of innocence.
Reply Obj. 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil: because they have from G.o.d their natural appet.i.te, which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.
Reply Obj. 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on (Q. 57, A. 3). But actions and pa.s.sions, which are within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there is an art of making pleasure, namely, ”the art of cookery and the art of making arguments,” as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 2]
Whether Every Pleasure Is Good?
Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in the First Part (Q. 5, A. 6) there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 6, 7. But pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in itself. Now that which is predicated of a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is good.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of itself: because good is ”what all things seek,” as stated in _Ethic._ i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently all pleasure is good.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 2:14): ”Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.”
_I answer that,_ While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual.
That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. In another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable.
And since pleasure is the repose of the appet.i.te in some good, if the appet.i.te reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a man's appet.i.te repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good.
Reply Obj. 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appet.i.te, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with regard to pleasure.
Reply Obj. 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appet.i.te in good. But, just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 3]
Whether Any Pleasure Is the Greatest Good?
Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good.
Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its own nature, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1).
Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue.
Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.
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