Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 58 (2/2)

If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appet.i.te to which both these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appet.i.te directly. Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appet.i.te itself, while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appet.i.te, through being repugnant to the body.

Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpa.s.ses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch.

Consequently inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appet.i.te, it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appet.i.te; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the pa.s.sage quoted above it is said expressively: ”Sadness of the heart is every wound,” because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the heart.

Reply Obj. 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain is compared to the appet.i.te.

Reply Obj. 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract.

Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward apprehension.

Reply Obj. 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appet.i.te is more material than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3; Q. 31, A. 5), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te: and, in like manner, from outward than from inward pain.

________________________

EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 8]

Whether There Are Only Four Species of Sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into ”torpor, distress,” which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]

calls ”anxiety,”--”pity,” and ”envy.” For sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to a.s.sign different species of sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, _Repentance_ is a species of sorrow; and so are _indignation_ and _jealousy,_ as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9, 11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division is insufficient.

Obj. 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]

”torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another's wrongs.” But it is possible for one to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is incorrect.

_On the contrary,_ stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] and of Damascene.

_I answer that,_ It belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein: thus ”rational” is added to ”animal.”

Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2, 3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that genus: thus ”white” or something of the kind may be added to ”animal.” Such an addition does not make true species of the genus, according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species.

But sometimes a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter.

In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is _one's own evil._ Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we have _pity_ which is sorrow for another's evil, considered, however, as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we have _envy._ The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain _flight of the appet.i.te._ Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have _anxiety_ which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also called _perplexity._ If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to _torpor,_ then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in the appet.i.te. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated in _Polit._ i, 1.

Reply Obj. 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; for the latter is caused by evil, which ”happens in many ways,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Reply Obj. 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species.

Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later (II-II, Q. 36, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3: This division is not according to opposite species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.

________________________

QUESTION 36

OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?

<script>