Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 61 (1/2)

Obj. 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily trans.m.u.tation in conjunction with it. But bodily trans.m.u.tation takes place in all the pa.s.sions of the soul, as stated above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other pa.s.sions of the soul.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that ”anger and desire drive some to madness”: which seems to be a very great harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow.

Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other pa.s.sions of the soul.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 17:22): ”A joyful mind maketh age flouris.h.i.+ng: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones”: and (Prov.

25:20): ”As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart”: and (Ecclus. 38:19): ”Of sadness cometh death.”

_I answer that,_ Of all the soul's pa.s.sions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quant.i.ty, as is the case with the other pa.s.sions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of quant.i.ty; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in respect of its species.

Now it must be noted that, in all the pa.s.sions of the soul, the bodily trans.m.u.tation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appet.i.tive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form. Consequently those pa.s.sions that imply a movement of the appet.i.te in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these pa.s.sions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those pa.s.sions which denote in the appet.i.te a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily trans.m.u.tation.

Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally moved by the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: Other pa.s.sions imply a bodily trans.m.u.tation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies a trans.m.u.tation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life.

Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness.

________________________

QUESTION 38

OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pain or sorrow is a.s.suaged by every pleasure?

(2) Whether it is a.s.suaged by weeping?

(3) Whether it is a.s.suaged by the sympathy of friends?

(4) Whether it is a.s.suaged by contemplating the truth?

(5) Whether it is a.s.suaged by sleep and baths?

________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 1]

Whether Pain or Sorrow Is a.s.suaged by Every Pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure a.s.suages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not a.s.suage sorrow, save in so far as it is contrary to it: for ”remedies work by contraries” (Ethic.

ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4). Therefore not every pleasure a.s.suages every sorrow.

Obj. 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not a.s.suage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in _Ethic._ ix, 4, ”the wicked man feels pain at having been pleased.” Therefore not every pleasure a.s.suages sorrow.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont to a.s.sociate with his friend, now dead: ”for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see him.” Hence we may gather that those things which united us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures become burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure a.s.suages every sorrow.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that ”sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense.”

_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been said above (Q. 23, A. 4), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appet.i.te in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appet.i.te.