Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 64 (1/2)
Obj. 2: Further, pa.s.sions differ according to their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz.
the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.
Obj. 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever is accidental to the object does not make a different species of pa.s.sion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope.
Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity.
_On the contrary,_ To different powers belong different species of pa.s.sions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity.
_I answer that,_ The species of a pa.s.sion is taken from the object.
Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil.
Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair. It is therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible pa.s.sions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible pa.s.sions presuppose the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.
Reply Obj. 2: The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the appet.i.tive power: because the appet.i.te is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything except under the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from despair according to the difference of possible and impossible.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 2]
Whether Hope Is in the Apprehensive or in the Appet.i.tive Power?
Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power.
Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:25): ”If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience.” But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, which we exercise by _looking out._ Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power.
Obj. 2: Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope and to be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too.
Obj. 3: Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power.
_On the contrary,_ Hope regards good, as stated above (A. 1). Now good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appet.i.tive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but to the appet.i.tive power.
_I answer that,_ Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appet.i.te towards good, it evidently belongs to the appet.i.tive power; since movement towards things belongs properly to the appet.i.te: whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower. But since the cognitive power moves the appet.i.te, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the appet.i.te various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appet.i.te, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise from the apprehension of something present and of something future; of something considered absolutely, and of something considered as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appet.i.tive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the appet.i.te to such a good.
Reply Obj. 1: Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in two ways, viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is not said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get by another's help, as though to await (_exspectare_) implied keeping one's eyes on another (_ex alio spectare_), in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the good which man intends to get, but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to Ecclus.
51:10, ”I looked for the succor of men.” Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding inspection of the cognitive power.
Reply Obj. 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appet.i.te is called confidence. Because the movement of the appet.i.te takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appet.i.te.
Reply Obj. 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appet.i.te; thus we say that a stone is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appet.i.te derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 3]
Whether Hope Is in Dumb Animals?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals.
Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.