Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 68 (1/2)
But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this light it is not an object of fear to him.
Reply Obj. 1: Separation from G.o.d is a punishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause.
Reply Obj. 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.
Reply Obj. 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause.
Reply Obj. 4: As stated above (Q. 41, A. 4, ad 2, 3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic cause.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 4]
Whether Fear Itself Can Be Feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss.
If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by being afraid: which seems absurd.
Obj. 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.
Obj. 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.
_On the contrary,_ A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), nothing can be an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far as it is a pa.s.sion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being a.s.sailed by some great evil.
It is subject to the will, in so far as the lower appet.i.te obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33).
Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then, prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him from the fear which he has not.
Reply Obj. 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a thing flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.
Reply Obj. 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 5]
Whether Sudden Things Are Especially Feared?
Objection 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that ”those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and cunning.” Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be feared.
Obj. 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that ”some appear to be courageous through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is different from what they expected, they run away.” Therefore sudden things are feared less.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): ”Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their safety.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 41, A. 2), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty.
Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem.
Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand.