Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 72 (1/2)
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special pa.s.sion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger (_ira_). But there are several pa.s.sions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special pa.s.sion.
Obj. 2: Further, to every special pa.s.sion there is a contrary pa.s.sion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no pa.s.sion is contrary to anger, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 3).
Therefore anger is not a special pa.s.sion.
Obj. 3: Further, one special pa.s.sion does not include another. But anger includes several pa.s.sions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2).
Therefore anger is not a special pa.s.sion.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special pa.s.sion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).
_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication; thus ”animal” is general in respect of all animals.
Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).
Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fas.h.i.+on, actually existing therein.
Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general pa.s.sion but is condivided with the other pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other pa.s.sions. But in this way, love may be called a general pa.s.sion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), because love is the primary root of all the other pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q.
27, A. 4). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general pa.s.sion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several pa.s.sions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), ”the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible.”
Consequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).
Reply Obj. 1: The irascible power takes its name from ”ira” (anger), not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent.
Reply Obj. 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary pa.s.sions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.
Reply Obj. 3: Anger includes several pa.s.sions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 2]
Whether the Object of Anger Is Good or Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is ”the sword-bearer of desire,” inasmuch, to wit, as it a.s.sails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.
Obj. 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its object, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 1). Therefore anger does also.
Obj. 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that ”anger acts with sorrow.” But evil is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that ”anger craves for revenge.” But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good: since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good.
Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.
_I answer that,_ The movement of the appet.i.tive power follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways the appet.i.tive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appet.i.te simply follows and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as when the appet.i.te is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.
We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a pa.s.sion somewhat made up of contrary pa.s.sions.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 3]
Whether Anger Is in the Concupiscible Faculty?
Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of ”desire.” But desire is in the concupiscible faculty.