Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 74 (1/2)
(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?
(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?
(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;
(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 1]
Whether the Motive of Anger Is Always Something Done Against the One Who Is Angry?
Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, can do nothing against G.o.d; since it is written (Job 35:6): ”If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?” And yet G.o.d is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according to Ps. 105:40: ”The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people.”
Therefore it is not always on account of something done against him, that a man is angry.
Obj. 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not always angry on account of something done against us.
Obj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those ”who despise what he takes a great interest in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy,” and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry.
Obj. 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm.
Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done against him.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that ”anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 46, A. 6), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him.
Reply Obj. 1: We speak of anger in G.o.d, not as of a pa.s.sion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do G.o.d any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against G.o.d in two ways. First, in so far as he despises G.o.d in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury redounds to G.o.d, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of G.o.d's providence and protection.
Reply Obj. 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kins.h.i.+p or friends.h.i.+p, or at least because of the nature we have in common.
Reply Obj. 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured.
Reply Obj. 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight is an action.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 2]
Whether the Sole Motive of Anger Is Slight or Contempt?
Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are angry ”when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury.” But one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger.
Obj. 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet ”they are roused to anger, when wounded,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8).
Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, ”being forgotten by others; that others should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like.” Therefore being slighted is not the only motive for being angry.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is ”a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly.”
_I answer that,_ All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. ”contempt,”
”despiteful treatment,” i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and ”insolence”: and all motives of anger are reduced to these three.