Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 90 (2/2)

Obj. 3: Further, prudence is ”a virtue whereby we are of good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.

_On the contrary,_ To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence ”to sin willingly”

(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.

_I answer that,_ Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue.

And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a pa.s.sion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because ”such a man is, such does the end seem to him” (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appet.i.te for the end: but appet.i.te for the end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.

Reply Obj. 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our appet.i.te whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appet.i.te, as prudence does.

Reply Obj. 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of the pa.s.sions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.

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QUESTION 59

OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE Pa.s.sIONS (In Five Articles)

We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.

And since those moral virtues which are about the pa.s.sions, differ accordingly to the difference of pa.s.sions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to pa.s.sion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the pa.s.sions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether moral virtue is a pa.s.sion?

(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with pa.s.sion?

(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?

(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a pa.s.sion?

(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without pa.s.sion?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 1]

Whether Moral Virtue Is a Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a pa.s.sion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two pa.s.sions. Therefore moral virtue is a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some pa.s.sions are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger. Therefore some pa.s.sions are virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, pity is a pa.s.sion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 8). Now ”Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue,” as Augustine states in _De Civ. Dei_ ix, 5. Therefore a pa.s.sion may be a moral virtue.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5 that ”pa.s.sions are neither virtues nor vices.”

_I answer that,_ Moral virtue cannot be a pa.s.sion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a pa.s.sion is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appet.i.te, being a kind of habit. Secondly, because pa.s.sions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason: wherefore the pa.s.sions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 3). Thirdly, because, granted that some pa.s.sions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement of pa.s.sion, as pa.s.sion, begins in the appet.i.te, and ends in the reason, since the appet.i.te tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appet.i.te, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is ”a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.”

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is a mean between pa.s.sions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between pa.s.sions.

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