Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 97 (1/2)
Objection 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by G.o.d. Because G.o.d does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), ”it is G.o.d's rule to bring about extremes through the mean.” Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above (A.
2). Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion.
Obj. 2: Further, much less superfluity is found in G.o.d's works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does G.o.d. But G.o.d sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss on Heb. 1 [*Cf. Jerome on Gal. 1: 15, 16].
Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 8:7): ”She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fort.i.tude.”
_I answer that,_ Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated (A. 1; Q. 51, A. 1): instead of which natural principles, G.o.d bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated (Q. 62, A.
1). Wherefore we need to receive from G.o.d other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from G.o.d immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.
Reply Obj. 2: The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to G.o.d Himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 3: The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 4]
Whether Virtue by Habituation Belongs to the Same Species As Infused Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said (A. 3), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.
Obj. 3: Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by G.o.d immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature.
But the man whom G.o.d made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species.
_On the contrary,_ Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, ”which G.o.d works in us without us,” as stated above (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.
_I answer that,_ There is a twofold specific difference among habits.
The first, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to ”chastise his body, and bring it into subjection” (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues.
The other specific difference among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their being ”fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of G.o.d”
(Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.
Reply Obj. 1: Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2: Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective acts are not identical.
Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if G.o.d wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts.
But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.
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QUESTION 64