Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 99 (2/2)

Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues.

_On the contrary,_ The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written (Rom. 13:8): ”He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law.” Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, 2. Therefore he that has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. x.x.xix and xlvi de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.

_I answer that,_ All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that G.o.d operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work.

It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues.

Reply Obj. 1: In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower power: for if the princ.i.p.al agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed.

Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end.

Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity.

Reply Obj. 2: It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.

Reply Obj. 3: Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 4]

Whether Faith and Hope Can Be Without Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity.

Obj. 2: Further, ”no man believes unwillingly” as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that ”there can be no hope without love.” But love is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.

_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Matt. 1:2 says that ”faith begets hope, and hope, charity.” Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity.

_I answer that,_ Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.

Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fas.h.i.+on without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in G.o.d; and since to believe is to a.s.sent to someone of one's own free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fort.i.tude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to G.o.d for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).

Reply Obj. 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this is not without charity.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 5]

Whether Charity Can Be Without Faith and Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of G.o.d. But it is possible for us to love G.o.d naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: ”Rooted and founded in charity.” Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope, and the other virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain further on (III, Q. 7, AA. 3, 4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.

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