Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 121 (2/2)

(3) Whether a sin resulting from a pa.s.sion is a sin of weakness?

(4) Whether the pa.s.sion of self-love is the cause of every sin?

(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 John 2:16: ”Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh,” and ”Pride of life.”

(6) Whether the pa.s.sion which causes a sin diminishes it?

(7) Whether pa.s.sion excuses from sin altogether?

(8) Whether a sin committed through pa.s.sion can be mortal?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Is Moved by a Pa.s.sion of the Sensitive Appet.i.te?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te. For no pa.s.sive power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a power both pa.s.sive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appet.i.tive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te does not move the will.

Obj. 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational appet.i.te, is compared to the sensitive appet.i.te, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that ”the rational appet.i.te moves the sensitive appet.i.te, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another.” Therefore the will cannot be moved by a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appet.i.te is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te cannot move the intellective appet.i.te.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 13:56): ”l.u.s.t hath perverted thy heart.”

_I answer that,_ A pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te is enforced in respect of any pa.s.sion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appet.i.te or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.

Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te, even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of pa.s.sion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.

Reply Obj. 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.

The Third Objection is solved in like manner.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 2]

Whether the Reason Can Be Overcome by a Pa.s.sion, Against Its Knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a pa.s.sion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its cert.i.tude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a pa.s.sion, which is weak and soon pa.s.ses away.

Obj. 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a pa.s.sion draws the will to that which is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason.

Therefore a pa.s.sion never influences the reason against its knowledge.

Obj. 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter--on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g.

”Every man,” and ”Not every man.” Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in _Peri Herm._ ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to p.r.o.nounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.

Obj. 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from _Poster._ i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g.

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