Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 124 (2/2)
Objection 1: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that ”an unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it,” i.e. through choice, ”unless it be done through habit.” Now to sin through certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above (A.
1). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin.
Obj. 2: Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that ”a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little.”
But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit.
Obj. 3: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good.
Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is pa.s.sion or habit. Now when a man sins through pa.s.sion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as stated (Q. 77, A. 3). Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain malice, he sins through habit.
_On the contrary,_ The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue.
Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.
_I answer that,_ The will is related differently to good and to evil.
Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appet.i.te, as when anyone sins through pa.s.sion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it.
Moreover this corrupt disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of h.e.l.l, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were.
It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins through habit.
Reply Obj. 1: To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit.
Reply Obj. 2: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something is not always a habit, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a pa.s.sion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfect without the evil of fault.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 4]
Whether It Is More Grievous to Sin Through Certain Malice Than Through Pa.s.sion?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through pa.s.sion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins through pa.s.sion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action.
Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through pa.s.sion.
Obj. 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous pa.s.sion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that of pa.s.sion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through pa.s.sion.
Obj. 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through pa.s.sion, also chooses evil.
Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice.
_On the contrary,_ A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: ”He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him.” Now punishment is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.
_I answer that,_ A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through pa.s.sion, for three reasons. First, because, as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through pa.s.sion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being committed through pa.s.sion, and so much the more, as the pa.s.sion is stronger. Secondly, because the pa.s.sion which incites the will to sin, soon pa.s.ses away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic.
vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through pa.s.sion, to one who suffers intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through pa.s.sion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the pa.s.sion, for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through pa.s.sion.
Reply Obj. 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 4).
Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.
Reply Obj. 2: The impulse due to pa.s.sion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.
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