Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 127 (1/2)
THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q, 80, Art. 3]
Whether the Devil Can Induce Man to Sin of Necessity?
Objection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of the devil (Job 41:24) that ”there is no power on earth that can compare with him.” Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the earth.
Obj. 2: Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to the imagination: because ”all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm” (De Anima iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated above (A. 2); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq.
lx.x.xiii, qu. 12) that ”this evil,” of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, ”extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor.” Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin of necessity.
Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that ”there is some sin when the flesh l.u.s.teth against the spirit.” Now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other pa.s.sions, in the way explained above (A. 2). Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): ”Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour.”
Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succ.u.mbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity.
Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): ”Be subject ... to G.o.d, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you,” which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin.
_I answer that,_ The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by G.o.d, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appet.i.te; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above (Q. 77, A. 7).
It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Not every power that is greater than man, can move man's will; G.o.d alone can do this, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 6).
Reply Obj. 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason.
Reply Obj. 3: The l.u.s.ting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 4]
Whether All the Sins of Men Are Due to the Devil's Suggestion?
Objection 1: It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the ”crowd of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others.”
Obj. 2: Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to John 8:34: ”Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin.” Now ”by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave” (2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lx.x.xii): ”Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will.”
_I answer that,_ the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all p.r.o.ne to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, s.e.xual pleasures and the like; which desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will.
Reply Obj. 1: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2: A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil.
Reply Obj. 3: The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already p.r.o.ne to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man.
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QUESTION 81
OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (In Five Articles)