Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 136 (2/2)
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 6]
Whether the Debt of Punishment Remains After Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also.
Obj. 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.
Obj. 3: Further, ”Punishments are a kind of medicine” (Ethic. ii, 3).
But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease.
Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Kings xii. 13, 14): ”David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die.
Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme ... the child that is born to thee shall die.”
Therefore a man is punished by G.o.d even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment remains, when the sin has been removed.
_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing G.o.d's commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of punishment.
But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul being united to G.o.d, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). Now man is united to G.o.d by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which G.o.d inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary (Q. 6, A. 6). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 2), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as stated.
Reply Obj. 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against G.o.d or man.
Reply Obj. 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 7]
Whether Every Punishment Is Inflicted for a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written (John 9:3, 2) about the man born blind: ”Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents ... that he should be born blind.” In like manner we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked (Ps. 72:5): ”They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men”; and (Job 21:7): ”[Why then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches” (?)[*The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (Hab. 1:13): ”Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: 'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than himself?” Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet. 2:22) that ”He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth.” And yet it is said (1 Pet.
2:21) that ”He suffered for us.” Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by G.o.d for sin.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): ”Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? _On the contrary,_ I have seen those who work iniquity ... peris.h.i.+ng by the blast of G.o.d”; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that ”all punishment is just, and is inflicted for a sin.”
_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 6), punishment can be considered in two ways--simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by G.o.d or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and this, either princ.i.p.ally or consequently--princ.i.p.ally, the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result from this defect in human nature.
Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5). Now evil is privation of good. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the glory of G.o.d. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause.
Reply Obj. 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of original sin, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 5); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above (Q. 85, A. 5, ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 5, ad 1).
Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others who are admonished by their means--and also to the glory of G.o.d.
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