Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 138 (2/2)
_I answer that,_ The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.
Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above (A. 2).
Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins const.i.tuting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated above (Q. 87, AA. 3, 5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing G.o.d, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one another.
If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above (A. 3) with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively.
Reply Obj. 2: The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.
Reply Obj. 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 5]
Whether a Circ.u.mstance Can Make a Venial Sin to Be Mortal?
Objection 1: It would seem that a circ.u.mstance can make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli) that ”if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins.” But anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circ.u.mstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Obj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [*See Q. 74, A. 6], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circ.u.mstance. Therefore a circ.u.mstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.
Obj. 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circ.u.mstance makes a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.
_On the contrary,_ Since a circ.u.mstance is an accident, its quant.i.ty cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus, because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpa.s.ses the quant.i.ty of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (Q. 72, A. 5, ad 1; Q. 87, A. 5, ad 1).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 7, A. 1; Q. 18, A. 5, ad 4; AA.
10, 11), when we were treating of circ.u.mstances, a circ.u.mstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circ.u.mstance may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circ.u.mstance, and const.i.tutes the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circ.u.mstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chast.i.ty; but if this other be another man's wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly this circ.u.mstance const.i.tutes a new species of sin known as adultery.
It is, however, impossible for a circ.u.mstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it has been stated above (A. 1) that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circ.u.mstance cannot make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circ.u.mstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference of the moral act.
Reply Obj. 1: Length of time is not a circ.u.mstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like.
We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great scandal or something of the kind.
With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere l.u.s.t of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to G.o.d and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature.
Reply Obj. 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason.
Reply Obj. 3: A circ.u.mstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it const.i.tute the species of a sin, as we have stated above (Q. 18, A. 5, ad 4).
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 6]
Whether a Mortal Sin Can Become Venial?
Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial.
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