Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 140 (2/2)
Whether the First Movements of the Sensuality in Unbelievers Are Mortal Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:1) that ”there is ... no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh”: and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rom.
7). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins.
Obj. 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): ”Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow the road of d.a.m.nation, even if they walk not according to the flesh.” But d.a.m.nation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are mortal sins.
Obj. 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): ”Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence.” Now this liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty.
_On the contrary,_ It is stated in Acts 10:34 that ”G.o.d is not a respecter of persons.” Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to unbelievers.
_I answer that,_ It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them.
This is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 79, A.
4). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins.
Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as stated above (Q. 73, A. 10). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: ”I obtained the mercy of G.o.d, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief”: whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. 10:29: ”How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments ... who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?”
Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, although the _fomes_ of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.
In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.
Reply Obj. 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 6]
Whether Venial Sin Can Be in Anyone with Original Sin Alone?
Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 88, A. 3). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins.
Obj. 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without committing a mortal sin.
Obj. 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that s.p.a.ce of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin.
_On the contrary,_ Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on (II-II, Q. 69, A. 6): whereas men are punished in h.e.l.l for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished for venial sin with no other than original sin.
_I answer that,_ It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due end, as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, through not doing that which is in his power to do. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace.
Reply Obj. 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.
Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to G.o.d as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by G.o.d's affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zech. 1:3): ”Turn ye to Me ... and I will turn to you.”
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TREATISE ON LAW (QQ. 90-108) ________________________
QUESTION 90
OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (In Four Articles)
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