Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 141 (2/2)
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that ”laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q.
2, A. 7; Q. 3, A. 1). Consequently the law must needs regard princ.i.p.ally the relations.h.i.+p to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relations.h.i.+p to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters ”just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic”: since the state is a perfect community, as he says in _Polit._ i, 1.
Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.
Reply Obj. 1: A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters.
Reply Obj. 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end.
Reply Obj. 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 3]
Whether the Reason of Any Man Is Competent to Make Laws?
Objection 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that ”when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law .
. . they are a law to themselves.” Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.
Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), ”the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue.” But every man can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws.
Obj. 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): ”A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty.”
_I answer that,_ A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by partic.i.p.ation as in one that is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him.
Hence the same text goes on: ”Who show the work of the law written in their hearts.”
Reply Obj. 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q. 92, A. 2, ad 3; II-II, Q. 64, A. 3). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone.
Reply Obj. 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according to _Polit._ i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs a family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the force of law.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 4]
Whether Promulgation Is Essential to a Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated.
Obj. 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others.
Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law.
Obj. 3: Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since ”laws are binding in matters of the future,” as the jurists say (Cod. 1, t.i.t. De lege et const.i.t. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law.
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