Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 145 (2/2)
FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 4]
Whether Necessary and Eternal Things Are Subject to the Eternal Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore G.o.d's will is subject to the eternal law.
But G.o.d's will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the King's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28, 24, ”shall be subject ... to G.o.d and the Father ... when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him.” Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies.
Therefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
_On the contrary,_ Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order to restrain them from evil, as explained above (Q. 92, A. 2).
Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the eternal law is the type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us. For those things are subject to human government, which can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by G.o.d, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.
Reply Obj. 1: We may speak of G.o.d's will in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus, since G.o.d's will is His very Essence, it is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of G.o.d's will, as to the things themselves that G.o.d wills about creatures; which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things G.o.d's will is said to be reasonable (_rationalis_): though regarded in itself it should rather be called their type (_ratio_).
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d the Son was not made by G.o.d, but was naturally born of G.o.d. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. x.x.xi). But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He.
The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are created.
Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise.
And this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 5]
Whether Natural Contingents Are Subject to the Eternal Law?
Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 4). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement.
Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently natural contingents are not.
Obj. 2: Further, ”Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason,”
as stated in _Ethic._ i. But the eternal law is the supreme type, as stated above (A. 1). Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.
Obj. 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the eternal law.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 8:29): ”When He compa.s.sed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pa.s.s their limits.”
_I answer that,_ We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which is the law of G.o.d. For the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things, for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2).
Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or p.r.o.nouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle of action.
Now just as man, by such p.r.o.nouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so G.o.d imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions.
And so, in this way, G.o.d is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps. 148:6: ”He hath made a decree, and it shall not pa.s.s away.” And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine commandment.
Reply Obj. 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as stated above.
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