Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 157 (2/2)
Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible pa.s.sions, but only of the concupiscible pa.s.sions.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 6]
Whether the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue Are Set in Proper Order?
Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly previous to love of G.o.d, since our neighbor is better known to us than G.o.d is; according to 1 John 4:20: ”He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love G.o.d, Whom he seeth not?” But the first three precepts belong to the love of G.o.d, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order.
Obj. 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts.
But according to Boethius in his commentary on the _Categories_ [*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative.
Obj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): ”The things that are of G.o.d, are well ordered” [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of G.o.d']. But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by G.o.d, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore they are arranged in becoming order.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 3, 5, ad 1), the precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once.
Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason.
Moreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society is G.o.d. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man to G.o.d; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other soldiers.
Now among those things whereby we are ordained to G.o.d, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander: and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service to him.
As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which regards his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods.
Reply Obj. 1: Although our neighbor is better known than G.o.d by the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of G.o.d is the reason for the love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on (II-II, Q. 25, A.
1; Q. 26, A. 2). Hence the precepts ordaining man to G.o.d demanded precedence of the others.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as G.o.d is the universal principle of being in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding G.o.d. This argument holds in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For although in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown, according to Ps. 33:15: ”Turn away from evil, and do good,” and Isa. 1:16, 17: ”Cease to do perversely; learn to do well”; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because ”the crooked line is known by the straight” (De Anima i): and ”by the law is the knowledge of sin” (Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmative precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding G.o.d, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last, since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
Reply Obj. 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of reason.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 7]
Whether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Formulated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others.
Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the first and third.
Obj. 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by G.o.d. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not only in the second and fourth.
Obj. 4: Further, the Old Law is called ”the law of fear,” in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in each, and not only in the first and second.
Obj. 5: Further, all the commandments of G.o.d should be retained in the memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): ”Write them in the tables of thy heart.” Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be made in the third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 11:21) that ”G.o.d made all things, in measure, number and weight.” Much more therefore did He observe a suitable manner in formulating His Law.
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