Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 25 (1/2)

(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?

(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another's happiness?

(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?

(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?

(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?

(7) Of its relation to faith;

(8) Of its relation to charity.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 1]

Whether Hope Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For ”no man makes ill use of a virtue,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the pa.s.sion of hope, like the other pa.s.sions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since ”G.o.d works virtue in us without us,” as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.

xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, ”virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing”

(Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have.

Therefore hope is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) ”the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good likewise.” Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad 3) human acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and h.o.m.ogeneous, viz.

the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. G.o.d: wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or G.o.d Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains G.o.d. For, as we have already stated (I-II, Q. 40, A. 1), when we were treating of the pa.s.sion of hope, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as stated in _Ethic._ iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the Divine a.s.sistance, our hope attains G.o.d Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to attain its due rule.

Reply Obj. 1: In the pa.s.sions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue.

Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man's attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. G.o.d. Consequently man cannot make ill use of hope which attains G.o.d, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a pa.s.sion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on (A. 5; Q. 18, A. 1).

Reply Obj. 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but from grace alone.

Reply Obj. 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. G.o.d, on Whose help he leans.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 17, Art. 2]

Whether Eternal Happiness Is the Proper Object of Hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpa.s.ses every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal happiness surpa.s.ses every movement of the human soul, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) that it hath not ”entered into the heart of man.” Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.

Obj. 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written (Ps. 36:5): ”Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it.” Now it is lawful for man to pray G.o.d not only for eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord's Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.

Obj. 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.