Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 36 (1/2)
Reply Obj. 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man's whole life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command, because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: ”The end of the commandment is charity.”
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 5]
Whether Charity Is One Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of charity--G.o.d and our neighbor--which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q. 17, A.
6; I-II, Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which G.o.d is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, charity comprises friends.h.i.+p for our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species of friends.h.i.+p (Ethic. viii, 3, 11, 12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various species.
_On the contrary,_ Just as G.o.d is the object of faith, so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: ”One faith.” Therefore charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.
_I answer that,_ Charity, as stated above (A. 1) is a kind of friends.h.i.+p of man for G.o.d. Now the different species of friends.h.i.+p are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, and in this way there are three species of friends.h.i.+p, namely friends.h.i.+p for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which friends.h.i.+ps are based; thus there is one species of friends.h.i.+p between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter on civil communion or on the comrades.h.i.+p of the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).
Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of G.o.d; and the fellows.h.i.+p of everlasting happiness, on which this friends.h.i.+p is based, is also one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several species.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if G.o.d and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for G.o.d is the princ.i.p.al object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for G.o.d's sake.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity regards princ.i.p.ally but one aspect of lovableness, namely G.o.d's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: ”Give glory to the Lord for He is good.” Other reasons that inspire us with love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary and result from the first.
Reply Obj. 3: Human friends.h.i.+p of which the Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of fellows.h.i.+p. This does not apply to charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 23, Art. 6]
Whether Charity Is the Most Excellent of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will, since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.
Obj. 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is beneath his master. Now ”faith ... worketh by charity,” according to Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.
Obj. 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than charity.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): ”The greater of these is charity.”
_I answer that,_ Since good, in human acts, depends on their being regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above (A. 3), namely, human reason and G.o.d: yet G.o.d is the first rule, whereby, even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their object is G.o.d, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains G.o.d most.
Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by another. But faith and hope attain G.o.d indeed in so far as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains G.o.d Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human operations or pa.s.sions.
Reply Obj. 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the excellence of the intellectual operation is a.s.sessed according to the measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will and of every appet.i.tive power is completed in the tendency of the appet.i.te towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the appet.i.tive operation is gauged according to the thing which is the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul.
Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7, 8): whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of G.o.d, ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.
Reply Obj. 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not prove.
Reply Obj. 3: The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.