Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 38 (1/2)

Reply Obj. 1: The virtue in accordance with which G.o.d gives His gifts to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this disposition or effort, by moving man's mind either more or less, according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): ”Who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light.”

Reply Obj. 2: The form does not surpa.s.s the proportion of the matter.

In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3: The angel's is an intellectual nature, and it is consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the First Part (Q. 61, A. 6).

Hence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the others, and those who fell became worse. But man's is a rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater natural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 4]

Whether Charity Can Increase?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing increases save what has quant.i.ty. Now quant.i.ty is twofold, namely dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a spiritual perfection, while virtual quant.i.ty regards the objects in respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore charity does not increase.

Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good.

Therefore charity cannot increase.

Obj. 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or corrupted, which is unreasonable.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep.

clx.x.xv.] that ”charity merits increase that by increase it may merit perfection.”

_I answer that,_ The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to G.o.d, Who is the last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to G.o.d, Who is approached, ”not by steps of the body but by the affections of the soul” [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. x.x.xii]: and this approach is the result of charity, since it unites man's mind to G.o.d. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he says (1 Cor. 12:31): ”I show unto you yet a more excellent way.”

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to virtual quant.i.ty: and the latter depends not only on the number of objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual quant.i.ty of charity increases.

Reply Obj. 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the act.

Reply Obj. 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in its essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according to its fervor.

But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in its subject.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 5]

Whether Charity Increases by Addition?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For just as increase may be in respect of bodily quant.i.ty, so may it be according to virtual quant.i.ty. Now increase in bodily quant.i.ty results from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that ”increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude.” Therefore the increase of charity which is according to virtual quant.i.ty is by addition.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul, according to 1 John 2:10: ”He that loveth his brother abideth in the light.” Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in a house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also increases in the soul by addition.

Obj. 3: Further, the increase of charity is G.o.d's work, even as the causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: ”He will increase the growth of the fruits of your justice.” Now when G.o.d first infuses charity, He puts something in the soul that was not there before. Therefore also, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.

_On the contrary,_ Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater results from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved in _Phys._ iii, text. 59, and _Metaph._ ii, 4. Therefore charity does not increase by addition.

_I answer that,_ Every addition is of something to something else: so that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For G.o.d is able to increase a bodily quant.i.ty by adding a magnitude which did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless capable of being distinguished from the quant.i.ty to which it is added. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose the distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.

Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric.

Specific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while numeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a habit may receive increase through extending to objects to which it did not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest charity extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the addition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as though the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to which it is added.