Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 45 (1/2)

Reply Obj. 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle's argument.

For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, because ”the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love what it knows not,” as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love G.o.d, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our love: and G.o.d is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: The likeness we have to G.o.d precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we share along with our neighbor in something received from G.o.d, we become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we ought to love G.o.d more than we love our neighbor.

Reply Obj. 3: Considered in His substance, G.o.d is equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess G.o.d's goodness equally with G.o.d, for G.o.d has it essentially, and our neighbor by partic.i.p.ation.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 3]

Whether Out of Charity, Man Is Bound to Love G.o.d More Than Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to love G.o.d more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) that ”a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly relations with himself.” Now the cause is stronger than its effect.

Therefore man's friends.h.i.+p towards himself is greater than his friends.h.i.+p for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more than G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good.

Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not love G.o.d more than himself.

Obj. 3: Further, a man loves G.o.d as much as he loves to enjoy G.o.d.

But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy G.o.d; since this is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out of charity, to love G.o.d more than himself.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): ”If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take offense if him also thou lovest for G.o.d's sake.” Now ”the cause of a thing being such is yet more so.” Therefore man ought to love G.o.d more than himself.

_I answer that,_ The good we receive from G.o.d is twofold, the good of nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellows.h.i.+p of natural goods bestowed on us by G.o.d is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves G.o.d above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the princ.i.p.al inclination of each part is towards common action conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much more is this realized with regard to the friends.h.i.+p of charity which is based on the fellows.h.i.+p of the gifts of grace.

Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love G.o.d, Who is the common good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in G.o.d as in the universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share of that happiness.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of friends.h.i.+p, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.

Reply Obj. 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.

Reply Obj. 3: That a man wishes to enjoy G.o.d pertains to that love of G.o.d which is love of concupiscence. Now we love G.o.d with the love of friends.h.i.+p more than with the love of concupiscence, because the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves G.o.d more than himself.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 26, Art. 4]

Whether Out of Charity, Man Ought to Love Himself More Than His Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to love himself more than his neighbor. For the princ.i.p.al object of charity is G.o.d, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 25, AA. 1, 12). Now sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to G.o.d than we are ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.

Obj. 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his neighbor's sake, according to Prov. 12:26: ”He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a friend, is just.” Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) ”charity seeketh not its own.” Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most.

Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39): ”Thou shalt love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: 'friend') as thyself.” Whence it seems to follow that man's love for himself is the model of his love for another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.

_I answer that,_ There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 7): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.

This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 12), G.o.d is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellows.h.i.+p in that good. Now fellows.h.i.+p is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to G.o.d. Wherefore just as unity surpa.s.ses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.