Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 54 (1/2)

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 1]

Whether Beneficence Is an Act of Charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity.

For charity is chiefly directed to G.o.d. Now we cannot benefit G.o.d, according to Job 35:7: ”What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He receive of thy hand?” Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.

Obj. 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of liberality and not of charity.

Obj. 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of charity.

_On the contrary,_ Charity is a kind of friends.h.i.+p, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of friends.h.i.+p (Ethic. ix, 1) ”doing good,” i.e. being beneficent, ”to one's friends.” Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to others.

_I answer that,_ Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of friends.h.i.+p, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 2). Now the will carries into effect if possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friends.h.i.+p or charity.

But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some special aspect of good, then beneficence will a.s.sume a special character and will belong to some special virtue.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), ”love moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relations.h.i.+p: it turns the inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the superior to watch over the inferior:” and in this respect beneficence is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit G.o.d, but to honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to bestow good things on us.

Reply Obj. 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward pa.s.sion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to liberality to moderate this inward pa.s.sion so as to avoid excessive desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence belongs in general to friends.h.i.+p or charity. Hence it does not detract from a man's friends.h.i.+p, if, through love, he give his friend something he would like to keep for himself; rather does this prove the perfection of his friends.h.i.+p.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as friends.h.i.+p or charity sees, in the benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of distress or defect.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]

Whether We Ought to Do Good to All?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all.

For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we ”are unable to do good to everyone.” Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) ”Give to the good, and receive not a sinner.” But many men are sinners. Therefore we need not do good to all.

Obj. 3: Further, ”Charity dealeth not perversely” (1 Cor. 13:4). Now to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to do good to an enemy of the common weal, or if one were to do good to an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of charity, we ought not to do good to all.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): ”Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men.”

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), beneficence is an effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels, because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to all, but according as time and place require: because all acts of virtue must be modified with a view to their due circ.u.mstances.

Reply Obj. 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the faithful.

Reply Obj. 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this would be to do evil rather than good.

Reply Obj. 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like distress, unless this be according to the order of justice.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 3]

Whether We Ought to Do Good to Those Rather Who Are More Closely United to Us?