Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 62 (1/2)
Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Obj. 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of G.o.d. But hatred of G.o.d does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
Obj. 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that ”anger grows into hatred.” Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) that ”out of envy cometh hatred.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), hatred of his neighbor is a man's last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it a.s.sumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it a.s.sumes the aspect of evil. Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor's good, it follows that our neighbor's good becomes hateful to us, so that ”out of envy cometh hatred.”
Reply Obj. 1: Since the appet.i.tive power, like the apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of circular movement in the actions of the appet.i.tive power. And so according to the first forward course of the appet.i.tive movement, love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.
Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the object of love is good, which flows from G.o.d to creatures, wherefore love is due to G.o.d in the first place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in G.o.d Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been stated above (A. 1), that G.o.d is not an object of hatred, except in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed to G.o.d. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred towards G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire our neighbor's evil according to a certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor's evil, which desire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by anger.
_______________________
QUESTION 35
OF SLOTH (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or about our neighbor's good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sloth is a sin?
(2) Whether it is a special vice?
(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?
(4) Whether it is a capital sin?
_______________________
FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 1]
Whether Sloth Is a Sin?
Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither praised nor blamed for our pa.s.sions, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a pa.s.sion, since it is a kind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above (I-II, Q. 35, A. 8). Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a sin. But sloth is like this, for Ca.s.sian says (De Inst.i.t. Monast. x, [*De Inst.i.tutione Caen.o.biorum]): ”The monk is troubled with sloth chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular and fixed intervals.” Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Ca.s.sian says (De Inst.i.t. Monast. x) that ”sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the one we dwell in”: all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth is not a sin.
Obj. 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2: ”Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent.” Now Ca.s.sian says (De Inst.i.t. Monast. x): ”Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance.”
Therefore sloth is not a sin.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such is sloth (_acedia_): for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): ”Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her,” namely spiritual wisdom, ”and be not grieved (_acedieris_) with her bands.” Therefore sloth is a sin.
_I answer that,_ Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, that he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on Ps. 106:18, ”Their soul abhorred all manner of meat,” and from the definition of some who say that sloth is a ”sluggishness of the mind which neglects to begin good.”
Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand, pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth, sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be ”swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.”