Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 74 (2/2)
Reply Obj. 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is ”descending from above” (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since faith a.s.sents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because ”a man judges well what he knows” (Ethic. i, 3).
Reply Obj. 3: Just as piety which pertains to the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d is a manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by wors.h.i.+pping G.o.d, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, because if a man fear and wors.h.i.+p G.o.d, this shows that he has a right judgment about Divine things.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]
Whether Wisdom Is in the Intellect As Its Subject?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that ”wisdom is the charity of G.o.d.” Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as stated above (Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): ”The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name,” for wisdom (_sapientia_) may be described as ”sweet-tasting science (_sapida scientia_),” and this would seem to regard the appet.i.te, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appet.i.te rather than in the intellect.
Obj. 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that ”wisdom is contrary to folly.” But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), wisdom denotes a certain rect.i.tude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rect.i.tude of judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chast.i.ty, a man after inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chast.i.ty judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality.
Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to p.r.o.nounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that ”Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things.”
Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to G.o.d, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: ”He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit.” Consequently wisdom which is a gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above (I-II, Q. 14, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence also wisdom (_sapientia_) takes its name, in so far as it denotes a certain sweetness (_saporem_). Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all.
Reply Obj. 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of knowledge, according to human ideas.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 45, Art. 3]
Whether Wisdom Is Merely Speculative, or Practical Also?
Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift, speculative and not practical.
Obj. 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.
Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that ”in contemplation we seek the Beginning which is G.o.d, but in action we labor under a mighty bundle of wants.” Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since according to Wis. 8:16, ”her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness.” Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not practical or active.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Col. 4:5): ”Walk with wisdom towards them that are without.” Now this pertains to action.
Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but also practical.
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same authority (De Trin. xii, 7) ”is intent on the consideration and consultation of the heavenly,” i.e. Divine, ”types” [*Cf. I, Q. 79, A. 9; I-II, Q. 74, A. 7]; it considers them, in so far as it contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human acts according to Divine rules.
Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also practical.
Reply Obj. 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of things to which it extends, as stated in _De Causis,_ prop. x, xvii.
Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to G.o.d more intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.
Reply Obj. 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are the subject-matter of human actions.
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