Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 77 (2/2)
Whether Prudence Takes Cognizance of Singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).
But ”reason deals with universals,” according to _Phys._ i, 5.
Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.
Obj. 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence which is right reason, is not about singulars.
Obj. 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that ”prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of singulars also.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), to prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as stated in _De Anima_ iii.
Reply Obj. 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be comprehended by human reason, that ”our counsels are uncertain”
(Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its princip[al] subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this sense.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 4]
Whether Prudence Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that ”prudence is the science of what to desire and what to avoid.” Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the _Predicaments_ (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but ”there is a virtue of art,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew ”to grave all sort of graving, and to devise ingeniously (_prudenter_) all that there may be need of in the work.” Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): ”Set bounds to thy prudence.” Therefore prudence is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, temperance, fort.i.tude and justice are four virtues.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 56, A. 1) when we were treating of virtues in general, ”virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.” Now good may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good, is the object of the appet.i.tive power.
Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the rect.i.tude of the appet.i.te, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the rect.i.tude of the appet.i.te, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of good.
Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3; A. 3) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appet.i.te. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any kind of right reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because art does not require rect.i.tude of the appet.i.te; wherefore in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will rectify his appet.i.te. Prudence however has nothing to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.
Reply Obj. 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other things according to prudence.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 5]
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