Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 83 (1/2)

Obj. 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because _seeing,_ whence we have the word ”to foresee,” has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence.

On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above (Q. 48).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 1, ad 2, AA. 6, 13), prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.

Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.

Reply Obj. 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the princ.i.p.al to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the princ.i.p.al of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight (_providentia_) as from its princ.i.p.al part.

Reply Obj. 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but only to practical matters.

Reply Obj. 3: Right order to an end which is included in the notion of foresight, contains rect.i.tude of counsel, judgment and command, without which no right order to the end is possible.

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 7]

Whether Circ.u.mspection Can Be a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that circ.u.mspection cannot be a part of prudence. For circ.u.mspection seems to signify looking at one's surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circ.u.mspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, circ.u.mstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But circ.u.mspection seems to denote nothing but attention to circ.u.mstances. Therefore circ.u.mspection apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.

Obj. 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore there is no need to account circ.u.mspection a part of prudence in addition to foresight.

On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above (Q.

48).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.

Since, however, prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 3) is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circ.u.mstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some combination of circ.u.mstances. Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circ.u.mspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the circ.u.mstances.

Reply Obj. 1: Though the number of possible circ.u.mstances be infinite, the number of actual circ.u.mstances is not; and the judgment of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number.

Reply Obj. 2: Circ.u.mstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circ.u.mstances.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circ.u.mspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circ.u.mstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 49, Art. 8]

Whether Caution Should Be Reckoned a Part of Prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required.

Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib.

Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the virtues.

Obj. 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, distinct from foresight.