Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 88 (1/2)

Obj. 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. _counsel,_ _judgment_ about what has been counselled, and _command_ [*Cf. Q. 47, A. 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 4:25): ”Let thy eyes look straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps.” Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness.

Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.

_I answer that,_ Thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about something. Now just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles.

Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of G.o.d alone, because ”as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to G.o.d,” according to 2 Paral. 20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with awaiting G.o.d's a.s.sistance, he would seem to tempt G.o.d.

Reply Obj. 2: All thought about those things of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rect.i.tude of judgment.

Reply Obj. 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 5]

Whether Inconstancy Is a Vice Contained Under Imprudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to fort.i.tude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fort.i.tude rather than to prudence.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): ”Where jealousy [Douay: 'envy'] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil work.” But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to imprudence but to envy.

Obj. 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of ”incontinency” in pleasurable matters, and of ”effeminacy” or ”squeamishness” in unpleasant matters, according to _Ethic._ vii, 1.

Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.

_On the contrary,_ It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence.

_I answer that,_ Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appet.i.te, for a man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist the impulse of the pa.s.sions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now just as all rect.i.tude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that rect.i.tude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what has been counselled and judged.

Reply Obj. 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fort.i.tude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary.

Reply Obj. 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appet.i.te, to which power the origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the appet.i.tive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which points to a defect in the appet.i.tive power); but reason stands firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this power inconstancy pertains also.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 53, Art. 6]

Whether the Aforesaid Vices Arise from l.u.s.t?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from l.u.s.t. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A. 5, ad 2).

But envy is a distinct vice from l.u.s.t.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): ”A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways.” Now duplicity does not seem to pertain to l.u.s.t, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do not arise from l.u.s.t.

Obj. 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than from carnal vices.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory declares (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) that the aforesaid vices arise from l.u.s.t.