Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 91 (1/2)
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:31): ”Be not solicitous ... saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?” And yet such things are very necessary.
_I answer that,_ Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is a.s.sured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): ”When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous, ' etc... . He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel.”
Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written (Matt. 13:22) that ”the care of this world ... chokes up the word.”
Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors bestowed by G.o.d on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body and soul (Matt. 6:26); secondly, on account of the care with which G.o.d watches over animals and plants without the a.s.sistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others.
Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.
Reply Obj. 1: Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and be over solicitous about them.
Reply Obj. 2: The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on Matt. 6:31, ”Be not solicitous,” that ”labor is necessary, but solicitude must be banished,” namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles the mind.
Reply Obj. 3: In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it be superfluous.
_______________________
SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 7]
Whether We Should Be Solicitous About the Future?
Objection 1: It would seem that we should be solicitous about the future. For it is written (Prov. 6:6-8): ”Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor master ... provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest.” Now this is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is praiseworthy.
Obj. 2: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its princ.i.p.al part is _foresight of future things,_ as stated above (Q. 49, A. 6, ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to be solicitous about the future.
Obj. 3: Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (John 12:6) that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts 4:34-37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about the future.
_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:34): ”Be not ...
solicitous for tomorrow”; where ”tomorrow” stands for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this pa.s.sage.
_I answer that,_ No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due circ.u.mstances, and among these is the due time, according to Eccles. 8:6, ”There is a time and opportunity for every business”; which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time.
Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying: ”Be ... not solicitous for tomorrow,” wherefore He adds, ”for the morrow will be solicitous for itself,” that is to say, the morrow will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. This is what He means by adding: ”Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof,” namely, the burden of solicitude.
Reply Obj. 1: The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example.
Reply Obj. 2: Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms ”past” and ”future” apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), ”when we see a servant of G.o.d taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to G.o.d for the sake of these things.”
_______________________
EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 55, Art. 8]
Whether These Vices Arise from Covetousness?
Objection 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As stated above (Q. 43, A. 6) l.u.s.t is the chief cause of lack of rect.i.tude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from l.u.s.t; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that ”Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored” and that ”he who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning.”
Obj. 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 13). Now, since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather than from covetousness.
Obj. 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold of other people's goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45) states that fraud is a daughter of covetousness.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 47, A. 13), carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appet.i.te. Hence the undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness.
Reply Obj. 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of concupiscence, l.u.s.t entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from l.u.s.t.