Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 98 (1/2)

FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]

Whether Judgment Is an Act of Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that ”everyone judges well of what he knows,” so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence.

Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4).

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): ”The spiritual man judgeth all things.” Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue of charity, which ”is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather than to justice.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its proper matter, because ”the virtuous man is the rule and measure in everything,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral virtues.

Obj. 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act of justice.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 93:15): ”Until justice be turned into judgment.”

_I answer that,_ Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such. Now a judge (_judex_) is so called because he a.s.serts the right (_jus dicens_) and right is the object of justice, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 1). Consequently the original meaning of the word ”judgment” is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about matters relating to chast.i.ty. Therefore judgment, which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that ”men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice.”

Reply Obj. 1: The word ”judgment,” from its original meaning of a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the virtue itself that p.r.o.nounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to p.r.o.nounce or define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fort.i.tude, it proceeds from fort.i.tude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence p.r.o.nounces judgment: wherefore _synesis_ which belongs to prudence is said to ”judge rightly,” as stated above (Q. 51, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he p.r.o.nounces judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man p.r.o.nounces judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law.

Reply Obj. 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above (Q.

58, A. 2). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in matters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are in question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further need for the judgment of a superior, who is ”able to reprove both, and to put his hand between both” [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any other virtue.

Reply Obj. 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. Q.

58, A. 6], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Lawful to Judge?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Matt.

7:1, ”Judge not, and ye shall not be judged.” Therefore it is unlawful to judge.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): ”Who art thou that judgest another man's servant[?] To his own lord he standeth or falleth.” Now G.o.d is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

Obj. 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 John 1:8, ”If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Now it is unlawful for a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, ”Thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest.” Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 16:18): ”Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates ... that they may judge the people with just judgment.”

_I answer that,_ Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (A. 1, ad 1, 3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be p.r.o.nounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is contrary to the rect.i.tude of justice, and then it is called ”perverted” or ”unjust”: secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment ”by usurpation”: thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it is called judgment by ”suspicion” or ”rash”

judgment.

Reply Obj. 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on Matt. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], He forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of heart.

Reply Obj. 2: A judge is appointed as G.o.d's servant; wherefore it is written (Deut. 1:16): ”Judge that which is just,” and further on (Deut. 1:17), ”because it is the judgment of G.o.d.”

Reply Obj. 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Matt. 7:1, ”Judge not.” Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the judge to p.r.o.nounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom.

in Monte ii, 19): ”If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to strive against it together with us.” And yet it is not through acting thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.