Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 101 (1/2)
Whether Rest.i.tution Is an Act of Commutative Justice?
Objection 1: It would seem that rest.i.tution is not an act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due.
Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due.
Therefore rest.i.tution is not the act of any part of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, that which has pa.s.sed away and is no more cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and pa.s.sions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore rest.i.tution would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, rest.i.tution is repayment of something taken away.
Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less than his due. Therefore rest.i.tution is not more an act of commutative than of distributive justice.
_On the contrary,_ Rest.i.tution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another.
Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs commutations.
_I answer that,_ To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in rest.i.tution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice.
Hence rest.i.tution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or theft.
Reply Obj. 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is a mere gift rather than a rest.i.tution, when anyone renders to another what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a rest.i.tution, since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not rest.i.tution properly so called.
Reply Obj. 2: In so far as the word rest.i.tution denotes something done over again, it implies ident.i.ty of object. Hence it would seem originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pa.s.s from one person to another, since they remain the same both substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as the term ”commutation” has pa.s.sed from such like things to those actions and pa.s.sions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term ”rest.i.tution” is applied, to things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or dishonored by injurious words.
Reply Obj. 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the latter receives so much the more according as he received less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative justice.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 2]
Whether Rest.i.tution of What Has Been Taken Away Is Necessary for Salvation?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.
Obj. 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.
Obj. 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
Obj. 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since ”to lack little is almost the same as to lack nothing at all,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): ”Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven.”
_I answer that,_ Rest.i.tution as stated above (A. 1) is an act of commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore rest.i.tution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need for rest.i.tution, for justice consists in equality. Since therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.
Reply Obj. 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to G.o.d and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14).
Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man.
Reply Obj. 2: There are three ways in which one may take away another's good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as when a man reveals another's sin, while observing the right order of so doing, and then he is not bound to rest.i.tution. Secondly, by saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man's good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another's sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above (ad 1).
Reply Obj. 3: The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its effect, viz. the lowering of the other man's personal dignity in the opinion of other men.
Reply Obj. 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view the honor of G.o.d or the good of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever to make rest.i.tution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has been definitely a.s.signed to anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the circ.u.mstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already been a.s.signed to a certain person, and someone, for some undue cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his means.
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