Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 102 (2/2)

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SEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 7]

Whether Rest.i.tution Is Binding on Those Who Have Not Taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that rest.i.tution is not binding on those who have not taken. For rest.i.tution is a punishment of the taker. Now none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to rest.i.tution save the one who has taken.

Obj. 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another's property. Now if rest.i.tution were binding not only on the man who takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both because he would receive rest.i.tution many times over, and because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the others are not bound to rest.i.tution.

Obj. 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in order to safeguard another's property. Now sometimes a man would expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to rest.i.tution, through not betraying or withstanding a thief.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:32): ”They who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that consent to them that do them.” Therefore in like manner they that consent are bound to rest.i.tution.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), a person is bound to rest.i.tution not only on account of someone else's property which he has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to rest.i.tution. This happens in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving.

Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any other kind of a.s.sistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer.

Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:

”By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by partic.i.p.ation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing.”

It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator is always bound to rest.i.tution. First, in the case of command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to rest.i.tution princ.i.p.ally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place.

Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives them a.s.sistance. Fourthly, in the case of partic.i.p.ation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty.

Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to rest.i.tution, if by their neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of their preserving justice here below.

In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to rest.i.tution: because counsel and flattery are not always the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is bound to rest.i.tution, only when it may be judged with probability that the unjust taking resulted from such causes.

Reply Obj. 1: Not only is he bound to rest.i.tution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.

Reply Obj. 2: He is bound chiefly to rest.i.tution, who is the princ.i.p.al in the deed; first of all, the _commander;_ secondly, the _executor,_ and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of them make rest.i.tution, another is not bound to make rest.i.tution to the same person. Yet those who are princ.i.p.als in the deed, and who took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have already made rest.i.tution. When a man commands an unjust taking that does not follow, no rest.i.tution has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly injured.

Reply Obj. 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to rest.i.tution, but only when he is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain justice.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 8]

Whether a Man Is Bound to Immediate Rest.i.tution, or May He Put It Off?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate rest.i.tution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making rest.i.tution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a man is not bound to immediate rest.i.tution.

Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is sometimes impossible to make rest.i.tution at once. Therefore no man is bound to immediate rest.i.tution.

Obj. 3: Further, rest.i.tution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice.

Now time is one of the circ.u.mstances requisite for virtuous acts.

Since then the other circ.u.mstances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems that neither in rest.i.tution is there any fixed time, so that a man be bound to restore at once.

_On the contrary,_ All matters of rest.i.tution seem to come under one head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not delay compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, ”The wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning.” Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of rest.i.tution, to delay, and rest.i.tution should be made at once.

_I answer that,_ Even as it is a sin against justice to take another's property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold the property of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to renounce one's sin at once, according to Ecclus.

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