Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 126 (2/2)
Reply Obj. 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in G.o.d's honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of G.o.d by reason of their specific character.
Reply Obj. 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now G.o.d's goodness is communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence the charity whereby G.o.d is loved is not distinct from the charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby G.o.d is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 5]
Whether Religion Is a Theological Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue.
Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that ”G.o.d is wors.h.i.+ped by faith, hope and charity,” which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay wors.h.i.+p to G.o.d. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has G.o.d for its object. Now religion has G.o.d for its object, since it directs us to G.o.d alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore religion is a theological virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (I-II, QQ. 57, 58, 62).
Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little, for one cannot wors.h.i.+p G.o.d too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, ”Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise.” Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4) religion pays due wors.h.i.+p to G.o.d. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to G.o.d, viz. wors.h.i.+p, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. G.o.d, to Whom wors.h.i.+p is paid. And yet the acts whereby G.o.d is wors.h.i.+ped do not reach out to G.o.d himself, as when we believe G.o.d we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q. 1, AA. 1, 2, 4) that G.o.d is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a G.o.d, but because we believe G.o.d.
Now due wors.h.i.+p is paid to G.o.d, in so far as certain acts whereby G.o.d is wors.h.i.+ped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for G.o.d. Hence it is evident that G.o.d is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.
Reply Obj. 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to G.o.d as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to G.o.d: and so Augustine says that G.o.d is wors.h.i.+ped by faith, hope and charity.
Reply Obj. 2: Religion directs man to G.o.d not as its object but as its end.
Reply Obj. 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a mean, not in the pa.s.sions, but in actions directed to G.o.d, by establis.h.i.+ng a kind of equality in them. And when I say ”equality,” I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay G.o.d as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man's ability and G.o.d's acceptance.
And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine wors.h.i.+p, not as regards the circ.u.mstance of quant.i.ty, but as regards other circ.u.mstances, as when Divine wors.h.i.+p is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other circ.u.mstance.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 81, Art. 6]
Whether Religion Should Be Preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal to G.o.d. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater need: wherefore it is written (Isa. 57:7): ”Deal thy bread to the hungry.” But G.o.d needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps. 15:2, ”I have said: Thou art my G.o.d, for Thou hast no need of my goods.” Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.
Obj. 3: Further, the greater the obligation to do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, ”If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me.” Now the more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what is paid to G.o.d by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human virtues.
_On the contrary,_ The precepts pertaining to religion are given precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral virtues.
_I answer that,_ Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (A. 5; Q. 4, A.
7), are about matters that are ordered to G.o.d as their end. And religion approaches nearer to G.o.d than the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of G.o.d. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.
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