Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 129 (1/2)
(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]
(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from G.o.d by praying? [*Art.
15]
(17) of the different kinds of prayer.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 1]
Whether Prayer Is an Act of the Appet.i.tive Power?
Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appet.i.tive power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is heard by G.o.d, according to Ps. 9:38, ”The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor.” Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the appet.i.tive power: and therefore prayer is also.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): ”It is useful to begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves to G.o.d and unite ourselves to Him.” Now union with G.o.d is effected by love which belongs to the appet.i.tive power. Therefore prayer belongs to the appet.i.tive power.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is ”the understanding of indivisibles,” by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: while the second is ”synthesis” and ”a.n.a.lysis,”
whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be added, namely, ”reasoning,” whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations.
Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the appet.i.tive power.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that ”to pray is to speak.”
Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not of the appet.i.tive, but of the intellective power.
_I answer that,_ According to Ca.s.siodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13]
”prayer (_oratio_) is spoken reason (_oris ratio_).” Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the ”reason exhorts us to do what is best.”
Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last paragraph refers to the Latin word _oratio_ (prayer) which originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from _os,_ _oris_ (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or pet.i.tion, in which sense Augustine [*Raba.n.u.s, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.) that ”prayer is a pet.i.tion,” and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that ”to pray is to ask becoming things of G.o.d.” Accordingly it is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.
Reply Obj. 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either because desire is the cause of their pet.i.tion, since a pet.i.tion is like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than G.o.d hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Isa. 65:24, ”And it shall come to pa.s.s, that before they call, I will hear.”
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1, ad 3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an end such as charity which is union with G.o.d. Now prayer tends to G.o.d through being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object of our pet.i.tion, because when we pray we ought princ.i.p.ally to ask to be united to G.o.d, according to Ps. 26:4, ”One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life.” Secondly, on the part of the pet.i.tioner, who ought to approach the person whom he pet.i.tions, either locally, as when he pet.i.tions a man, or mentally, as when he pet.i.tions G.o.d. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that ”when we call upon G.o.d in our prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence”: and in the same sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that ”prayer is the raising up of the mind to G.o.d.”
Reply Obj. 3: These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by way of command or of pet.i.tion, as stated above.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 2]
Whether It Is Becoming to Pray?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the person to whom we pray. But according to Matt. 6:32, ”Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things.” Therefore it is not becoming to pray to G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But G.o.d's mind is unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, ”But the Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance.” Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not, than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1), ”nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers.”
But G.o.d is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to G.o.d.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 18:1): ”We ought always to pray, and not to faint.”
_I answer that,_ Among the ancients there was a threefold error concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): ”You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth G.o.d.” Another opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of necessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d. All these opinions were disproved in the First Part (Q. 19, AA. 7, 8; Q. 22, AA. 2, 4; Q. 115, A. 6; Q. 116). Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part of the Divine disposition.