Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 138 (1/2)

Obj. 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26, 28), it is prescribed not only that the Levites should receive t.i.thes from the people, but also that they should themselves pay t.i.thes to the high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay t.i.thes to the Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay t.i.thes to the clergy.

Obj. 4: Further, t.i.thes should serve not only for the support of the clergy, but also for the a.s.sistance of the poor. Therefore, if the clergy are exempt from paying t.i.thes, so too are the poor. Yet the latter is not true. Therefore the former is false.

_On the contrary,_ A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: ”It is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand t.i.thes from the clergy” [*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.].

_I answer that,_ The cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of pa.s.sion; yet it happens that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes and from different points of view. Now t.i.thes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Wherefore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as having ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay t.i.thes; whereas from some other cause through holding property in their own right, either by inheriting it from their kindred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they are bound to the payment of t.i.thes.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy like anyone else are bound to pay t.i.thes on their own lands to the parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church, because to possess a thing as one's private property is not the same as possessing it in common. But church lands are not t.i.thable, even though they be within the boundaries of another parish.

Reply Obj. 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls, and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay t.i.thes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay t.i.thes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions granted by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad audientiam, de Decimis, etc.].

Reply Obj. 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests, and t.i.thes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the high-priest ”the tenth part of the tenth” [*Num. 18:26] instead of first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now to pay t.i.thes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate of a mult.i.tude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be able to carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.

Reply Obj. 4: t.i.thes should be employed for the a.s.sistance of the poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no reason for accepting t.i.thes, but they are bound to pay them.

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QUESTION 88

OF VOWS (In Twelve Articles)

We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to G.o.d.

Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) What is a vow?

(2) What is the matter of a vow?

(3) Of the obligation of vows;

(4) Of the use of taking vows;

(5) Of what virtue is it an act?

(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than without a vow?

(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;

(8) Whether those who are under another's power can take vows?

(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?

(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?

(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of continence?

(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation from a vow?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 88, Art. 1]

Whether a Vow Consists in a Mere Purpose of the Will?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum.

Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], ”a vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before G.o.d to do or not to do a certain thing.” But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.