Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 146 (2/2)

Objection 1: It would seem that superst.i.tion is not a vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other. But religion is included in the definition of superst.i.tion: for the latter is defined as being ”immoderate observance of religion,” according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, ”Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in superst.i.tion.” Therefore superst.i.tion is not a vice contrary to religion.

Obj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): ”Cicero [*De Natura Deorum ii, 28] states that the superst.i.tious were so called because they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive (_superst.i.tes_) them.” But this may be done even in accordance with true religious wors.h.i.+p. Therefore superst.i.tion is not a vice opposed to religion.

Obj. 3: Further, superst.i.tion seems to denote an excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 5, ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to G.o.d, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superst.i.tion is not a vice contrary to religion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): ”Thou strikest the first chord in the wors.h.i.+p of one G.o.d, and the beast of superst.i.tion hath fallen.” Now the wors.h.i.+p of one G.o.d belongs to religion. Therefore superst.i.tion is contrary to religion.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5), religion is a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above (I-II, Q. 64, A. 1). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue; one by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circ.u.mstance called ”how much,” but also with regard to other circ.u.mstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other circ.u.mstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1, 2, 3).

Accordingly superst.i.tion is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not that it offers more to the divine wors.h.i.+p than true religion, but because it offers divine wors.h.i.+p either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil things--thus we speak of a good thief--so too sometimes the names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Luke 16:8, ”The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser']

in their generation than the children of light.” It is in this way that superst.i.tion is described as religion.

Reply Obj. 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ sometimes: for ”lapis” (a stone) takes its name from hurting the foot (_laedere pedem_), but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that ”superst.i.tion” means that from which the word is derived.

Reply Obj. 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute quant.i.ty, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate quant.i.ty, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine wors.h.i.+p that ought not to be done.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 92, Art. 2]

Whether There Are Various Species of Superst.i.tion?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of superst.i.tion. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), ”if one contrary includes many kinds, so does the other.” Now religion, to which superst.i.tion is contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has superst.i.tion various species.

Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to which superst.i.tion is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are directed to G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore superst.i.tion, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain human actions.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, ”Which things have ... a show of wisdom in superst.i.tion,” adds: ”that is to say in a hypocritical religion.” Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of superst.i.tion.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine a.s.signs the various species of superst.i.tion (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).

_I answer that,_ As stated above, sins against religion consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circ.u.mstances (A. 1). For as we have stated (I-II, Q. 72, A. 9), not every diversity of corrupt circ.u.mstances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 2, 6).

Accordingly the species of superst.i.tion are differentiated, first on the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the divine wors.h.i.+p may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true G.o.d, but _in an undue mode,_ and this is the first species of superst.i.tion; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superst.i.tion, divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine wors.h.i.+p. For the end of divine wors.h.i.+p is in the first place to give reverence to G.o.d, and in this respect the first species of this genus is _idolatry,_ which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by G.o.d Whom he wors.h.i.+ps; and to this must be referred _divinatory_ superst.i.tion, which consults the demons through compacts made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine wors.h.i.+p is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of G.o.d the object of that wors.h.i.+p: and to this must be referred the superst.i.tion of certain _observances._

Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he says that ”anything invented by man for making and wors.h.i.+pping idols is superst.i.tious,” and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on to say, ”or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens,” which refers to the second species; and a little further on he adds: ”To this kind belong all sorts of amulets and such like,” and this refers to the third species.

Reply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), ”good results from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single defect.” Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 10, A. 5). The saying of the Philosopher is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.

Reply Obj. 2: Divinations and certain observances come under the head of superst.i.tion, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.

Reply Obj. 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for ”religion as applied to human observances,” as the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than wors.h.i.+p given to G.o.d in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time of grace, to wish to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.

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QUESTION 93

OF SUPERSt.i.tION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORs.h.i.+P OF THE TRUE G.o.d (In Two Articles)

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