Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 155 (1/2)
If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose instance he demands it.
Reply Obj. 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), ”though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others.” Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.
Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the pa.s.sage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another's perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced ”to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm.” Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another person's injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 7; Q. 68, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as G.o.d does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil.
Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false G.o.ds, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false G.o.ds. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true G.o.d, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false G.o.ds, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii).
Hence when a man swears falsely by the true G.o.d his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully.
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QUESTION 99
OF SACRILEGE (In Four Articles)
We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony.
Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is sacrilege?
(2) Whether it is a special sin?
(3) Of the species of sacrilege;
(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.
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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 1]
Whether Sacrilege Is the Violation of a Sacred Thing?
Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can.
Si quis suadente]): ”They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honor.” Now this seems to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sacred.
Obj. 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can.
Const.i.tuit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, ”he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege.”
Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.
Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d's power is greater than man's. Now sacred things receive their sacred character from G.o.d. Therefore they cannot be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that ”a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects,” i.e. steals, ”sacred things.”
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 81, A. 5; I-II, Q. 101, A. 4), a thing is called ”sacred” through being deputed to the divine wors.h.i.+p.
Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing a.s.sume a divine character through being deputed to the divine wors.h.i.+p, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is referred to G.o.d. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to G.o.d, and comes under the head of sacrilege.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, ”Being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly.” Hence by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.