Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 159 (1/2)
Whether Piety Extends to Particular Human Individuals?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, which the Greeks designate by the term _eusebeia_. But the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d does not denote relation to man, but only to G.o.d. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain human individuals.
Obj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): ”Piety, on her day, provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy.” Now the works of mercy are to be done to all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain special persons.
Obj. 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual relations besides those of kindred and citizens.h.i.+p, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11, 12), and on each of them is founded a kind of friends.h.i.+p, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, ”Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay: 'G.o.dliness'].” Therefore piety extends not only to one's kindred and fellow-citizens.
_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that ”it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country and render them faithful service.”
_I answer that,_ Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. On both counts G.o.d holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after G.o.d. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give wors.h.i.+p to G.o.d, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give wors.h.i.+p to one's parents and one's country.
The wors.h.i.+p due to our parents includes the wors.h.i.+p given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The wors.h.i.+p given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these.
Reply Obj. 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the wors.h.i.+p due to G.o.d includes the wors.h.i.+p due to our parents as a particular.
Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): ”If I be a father, where is My honor?” Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine wors.h.i.+p.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), ”the term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that G.o.d Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word 'pious' to G.o.d Himself.”
Reply Obj. 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.
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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 2]
Whether Piety Provides Support for Our Parents?
Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, ”Honor thy father and mother,” belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide support for one's parents.
Obj. 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), ”neither ought the children to lay up for the parents.” Therefore piety does not oblige them to support their parents.
Obj. 3: Further, piety extends not only to one's parents, but also to other kinsmen and to one's fellow-citizens, as stated above (A. 1).
But one is not bound to support all one's kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one's parents.
_On the contrary,_ our Lord (Matt. 15:3-6) reproved the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their parents.
_I answer that,_ We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son's superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that ”piety gives both duty and homage”: ”duty”
referring to service, and ”homage” to reverence or honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), ”we are said to give homage to those whose memory or presence we honor.”
Reply Obj. 1: According to our Lord's interpretation (Matt. 15:3-6) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one's father because it is due to him as to one greater.
Reply Obj. 2: Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents.
Reply Obj. 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), ”we offer homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country”; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others according to our means and their personal claims.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 101, Art. 3]
Whether Piety Is a Special Virtue Distinct from Other Virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity.