Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 160 (2/2)

Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him wors.h.i.+p, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the benefits we received from him.

Reply Obj. 1: Wors.h.i.+p includes not only honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and man.

Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 80), debt is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor and wors.h.i.+p to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe wors.h.i.+p and honor to persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.

Reply Obj. 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their labor.

_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 102, Art. 3]

Whether Observance Is a Greater Virtue Than Piety?

Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety.

For the prince to whom wors.h.i.+p is paid by observance is compared to a father who is wors.h.i.+ped by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance is a greater virtue than piety.

Obj. 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good. Therefore observance, whereby wors.h.i.+p is paid to persons in positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays wors.h.i.+p to one's kindred.

Obj. 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the first place after G.o.d. Now honor and reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3).

Therefore observance takes the first place after religion.

_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue.

Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order of excellence.

_I answer that,_ Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state.

This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays wors.h.i.+p not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland.

Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's substance than external government, the principle of which is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays wors.h.i.+p to persons more akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.

Reply Obj. 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but not as regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all things derive their being.

Reply Obj. 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are related to the common good, their wors.h.i.+p does not pertain to observance, but to piety, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3: The rendering of honor or wors.h.i.+p should be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of honor than the persons of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received from their parents and their natural kins.h.i.+p with them, to pay wors.h.i.+p and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred.

_______________________

QUESTION 103

OF DULIA (In Four Articles)

We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?

(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?

(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and wors.h.i.+p to those who are above us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?

<script>