Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 166 (1/2)

Whether the Repayment of Grat.i.tude Should Surpa.s.s the Favor Received?

Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of grat.i.tude to surpa.s.s the favor received. For it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one's parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore grat.i.tude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater.

Obj. 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since ”the indefinite removes the nature of good” (Metaph. ii, text.

8). Therefore repayment of grat.i.tude should not surpa.s.s the favor received.

Obj. 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But ”more” is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and opposed to justice.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): ”We should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return,” and this is done by repaying more than we have received.

Therefore grat.i.tude should incline to do something greater.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), grat.i.tude regards the favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quant.i.ty of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore grat.i.tude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 3, ad 5; A. 5), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for grat.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 2: The debt of grat.i.tude flows from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, ”Owe no man anything, but to love one another.” Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of grat.i.tude has no limit.

Reply Obj. 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in grat.i.tude we consider equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.

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QUESTION 107

OF INGRAt.i.tUDE (In Four Articles)

We must now consider ingrat.i.tude, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether ingrat.i.tude is always a sin?

(2) Whether ingrat.i.tude is a special sin?

(3) Whether every act of ingrat.i.tude is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 107, Art. 1]

Whether Ingrat.i.tude Is Always a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingrat.i.tude is not always a sin. For Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that ”he who does not repay a favor is ungrateful.” But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.

Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingrat.i.tude is not always a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i), ”no man sins in what he cannot avoid.” Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid ingrat.i.tude, for instance when he has not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that ”to forget a kindness is the height of ingrat.i.tude.” Therefore ingrat.i.tude is not always a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), ”Owe no man anything.” Yet ”an unwilling debtor is ungrateful,” as Seneca declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingrat.i.tude is not always a sin.

_On the contrary,_ Ingrat.i.tude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim.

3:2), where it is written: ”Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked.” etc.